The session began by Dr. Basit Koshul describing the topic as a juxtaposition between theories proposed by modern “enlightened” minds (as read by John Gray) and the wisdom of pre-modern culture (as represented by a poet best described as a “paindu”). The point of juxtaposition was the (un)reality of God and the reason for juxtaposition was to interrogate the culturally supremacist “more-rational-than-thou” attitude of the establishment in academia towards the lived reality of the masses outside the ivory towers.

Using John Gray as point of reference, Dr. Basit began the discussion by looking at the meaning of the term “atheism.” He described the many meanings and contexts in which this term has been used. One of the earliest charges of "atheism" that is recorded was against the emerging Christian community in the Roman Empire. Their crime was “atheism” not because they did not believe in a God, but because they did not take part in the official festivals which recognized the emperor as a divine being. For this crime, they were killed in brutal ways--i.e. thrown in front of hungry lions, burnt alive, and crucified (often in front of jubilantly cheering crowds in the Coliseum).

Given the history of the use of this terms, John Gray informs the reader that he will use the term "atheism" to mean "the rejection of the idea of a Creator God." In doing so, the definition becomes particularly important for Judaism, Christianity, and Islam--and does not have any meaning for Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism (and many other traditions) for which the issue of a Creator God does not even emerge. Gray then goes on to list seven types of atheism which Dr. Basit enumerated backwards.

7 – Mystical Atheism: This category points towards something that transcends all human comprehension. It is a feeling of a universal force of some type, the idea that there is ‘something’ out there, such as in Hinduism or Buddhism or what was propounded by Schopenhauer or Spinoza. Despite the idea or feeling it embodies, it is a clear rejection of the idea of a creator God.

6 – Unsentimental Atheism: This category rejects a creator God without any faith or feeling for a superior force. It rejects all faith, feeling and notions of progress or humanity. Examples are Georgia Santayana and Joseph Conrad. John Gray himself identifies with these first two categories.

5 – God-haters: This category holds hatred towards a personal God, one who may or may not be listening, alongside a conscious attempt to replace him with a substitute. There is also a sub-type here which considers the devil to be worth praising.

4 – Political Religions: Here belong those belief systems that say that deliverance from poverty and conflict can be brought about through social engineering or political ideologies. This category of atheism puts its faith in these programs as a way to alleviate human suffering in the world. Communism and Nazism are just two such examples in modern history.

3 – Science religion: Here lie those beliefs that say that scientific knowledge and progress can bring relief from suffering. Examples are dialectical materialism and transhumanism which talk about even transcending the human nature.

2 – Secular Humanism: This is the hollowed-out version of the Christian belief in salvation in history. For the Christians, generally speaking, the movement of history is forward and upward and its end is typified by the Christian vision of “the lamb lying with the lion”. This is a linear understanding of history and it is very different from Hindu, Buddhist, or classical Greek understanding of history which is cyclical. John Gray mentions that this monotheistic way of thinking echoes in secular humanism.

1 – New Atheism: The new atheism is the seventh type of atheism--about which there nothing "new" whatsoever because it is nothing other than a rehashing of 19th century ideology in the 21st century. Gray shows that practically every claim of new atheism can be traced back to August Comte’s “religion of humanity."

Gray notes that the core claims of each of these different types of atheism are nothing more than secularized versions of millennia old religious beliefs. This is an easily demonstrable fact of which practically all self-styled independent, critical thinking atheists are utterly ignorant. This is especially true of the proponents of New Atheism which is a plagiarized version of the secularized expression of core Biblical teachings. In addition to this common trait shared by the seven types of atheism, Dr. Basit went on to identify two more:

1. There are fundamental and irreconcilable contradiction between the seven types.
2. There are fundamental and irreconcilable diffferences among thinkers within each of the seven types.

In short, modern atheism is characterized by: a) Ignorance (about its historical roots and origins) and b) Deep Contradictions (between and among its various types). These two traits provide the foundations of which the "rationality" of the "more-rational-than-thou" attitude of the modern atheist is constructed.

Coming to the poem تم اک گورکھ دھندا ہو, Dr. Basit began by noting that the critique of a Creator God offered by the seven types of atheism can be put into two categories: intellectual and practical. The intellectual critique consists in the problem of reconciling One Creator with multiplicity of the Many in creation. How is it possible for One God who is free of contradictions and multiplicity to create a universe that is inundated everywhere by polar opposites? The practical critique consists in reconciling the idea of an all-Powerful, all-Just, and all-Loving God with the experience of unjust suffering and undeserved reward in the world--especially the unjust suffering of those individuals who believe in this One God.

This poem by Naz Khialvi is a jewel in the crown of a religious intellectual tradition that has been aware of these questions from the very moment of its inception. Dr. Basit noted how the poet has masterfully woven the two critiques in the poem and also pointed out a few couplets in the poem that correlate with each category. For instance, in the second last stanza, the verses starting from {راہ تحقیق میں ہر گام پہ الجھن دیکھوں ؛ وہی حالات و خیالات میں ان بن دیکھوں} (On the path of inquiry, I see confusion at every footstep; I see the same discord between circumstances and ideas) to {دن کے ہاتھوں میں فقط ایک سلگتا سورج ؛ رات کی مانگ ستاروں سے مزین دیکھوں} (In the day’s hands, there is only one smoldering sun; But I see that the night’s māng is adorned with many stars) are a vivid expression of the intellectual critique. The poet then artfully leverages the analogy of autumn vs. spring in nature to segue into the practical critique starting from {کہیں مرجھائے ہوئے پھول ہیں سچائی کے ؛ اور کہیں جھوٹ کے کانٹوں پہ بھی جوبن دیکھوں} (In one place are the withered flowers of truth; In another place I see the thorns of deceit flourishing) until the stanza ends with the motif {تم اک گورکھ دھندا ہو} (You are a paradoxical affair).

After demonstrating instances of these two kinds of critiques from the poem, Dr. Basit noted that atheism and generally, secular academia, understands the significance of these questions for the meaningfulness (or lack thereof) of the human experience, but it is attempting to come up with its own answers bypassing the historic religious intellectual traditions that they have rejected apriori. In the teeth of these efforts, he made a brief but succinct remark quoting Max Weber and Leo Tolstoy that science (as contradistinguished from religion) has neither the authority nor the capability to attempt an answer to these questions. Weber in particular delivers a sharp criticism, calling such individuals “academic prophets” who wish to become surrogates or ‘reincarnations’ of the prophets and messiahs of the old.

Thus, the modern self has two choices: the secular ‘open-mindedness’ (which is ultimately based on ignorance and contradictions) or the religious self-critique (whose starting and ending points are self-awareness and self-consciousness). Which one is more open minded? Which one shows greater capacity for critical thinking? Which one cultivates a more tolerant attitude towards the other? With these questions, Dr. Basit ended his part of the talk.

When Mr. Asif took the stage, he began with asking permission from the audience to communicate in Urdu. Then he went on to mention that the role of a teacher is to state facts, not their own views. Mr. Asif then went on to elaborate on the notion of tolerance and this question becomes notable in the context of moral positions. Once a moral position has been taken, can tolerance still be exercised? Moreover, what kind of behavior does science itself indicate? In the face of an oncoming truck, does the onlooker demand for proof and certainty? Or must they form a judgement and act accordingly? In the moral world, one must ‘decide’. Can that be called intolerance?

Mr. Asif gave examples of Mother Teresa and Father Damien, and highlighted that these great figures did not identify themselves as social workers, but devotees of God. They were not “humanists,” they were “believers.” Mother Teresa said to her colleague: "Father, please tell the world what I am not. I am not a social worker, not a humanitarian, and whatever I do, I do it for the Lord." Similarly, father Damien, who suffered from the disease of leprosy, did not go to the church to "serve humanity," but to show that God still loves us. Mr. Asif also gave multiple similar examples from the lives of Al-Ghazali and Ibn Rushd.

Here he also mentioned a quote from Russell: knowledge breeds from confusion to more confusion. Then he mentioned that in religion, such a position makes no sense, for religion demands decision and conduct. He noted particularly that at least from an Islamic point of view, this view is inadmissible because it runs contrary to the spirit of Tawḥīd that demands from us to make a decision and choose one out of two mutually incompatible conclusions. Therefore, religious scholars are not impeded asking this or that question. The only difference between a religious inquirer and a scientific inquirer is that the former also has a moral imperative and he cannot stand in conflict with it. As soon as a question is raised, the religious scholar will start research, but this research will not be a “rejection”. It will be research and inquiry. Thus, the religious stance does not equate doubt or conflict with rejection. What kind of life would it be if one begins rejecting all dearly held beliefs based on a doubt?

Thus, the search is not impeded in the religious tradition, rather, the religious inquirer moves from certitude to more certitude rather than from confusion to more confusion. In religious tradition, we are not hiding from life, we are facing it while we conduct our research. God is the destination but He is also the way.

During the Q&A, a member from the audience asked Dr. Basit to clarify what he said about Weber's contentions regarding the "academic prophets" and its prescriptions for the faculty members. In response, Dr. Basit spoke reflectively that, "my job as a teacher is to put all the facts on the table, especially the ones that are uncomfortable for the party position i.e., the status quo."

A couple of other questions were directed to both speakers pertaining to the popular issues and debates that surround religion. One particular question directed to Dr. Basit pertained to the popular debate of free will vs. determinism and the grounds for the authority of a messenger's reports. Dr. Basit refused to answer these questions stating that they had nothing to do with the topic at hand. Furthermore, he lamented the dearth of any fresh perspective with which to approach the religion-science debate which is one of the key motivations for the Two Cultures Initiative – to talk about intersectional issues in a mutually intelligible way. In response to another such question, Mr. Asif highlighted that religion and science follow different "epistemes" and therefore their respective knowledge claims must be evaluated on independent standards. Dr. Basit however noted his disagreement and mentioned that the difference between the two fields lies not in an absolute distinction of their "epistemes" but rather, on their unique points of emphasis.